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Introduction 
In May 2011, the final report of the Review Committee into the World Health Organization's (WHO's) 
response to the 2009-2010 H1N1 pandemic highlighted the significance of 'initial event information' in 
enabling it to improve global public health governance (WHO, 2011: 71). In particular, 'information sources 
in the public domain, such as new media websites' were cited as an 'important source [..] for the WHO' 
(WHO, 2011: 71). Consequently, the Committee recommended that the WHO enhance its central repository 
on epidemic information to include 'more events’ in addition to ‘expanding information on each event' 
(WHO, 2011: 13). Meeting this recommendation requires further event-based surveillance.  
 
At a time of rapid disease spread, facilitated in great part by widespread aeromobility, the international 
community increasingly uses, and relies on, event-based information systems such as the Global Public 
Health Intelligence Network (GPHIN) and HealthMap. Event-based surveillance differs from traditional 
indicator-based surveillance in that - rather than reporting cases of disease - it aims rapidly to detect, report 
and assess public health events, including clusters of disease and rumours of unexplained deaths. Notably, 
event-based systems assess disease risk by examining often unverified media sources. As such, this activity 
arguably adds a new dimension to the 'Surveillance Industrial Complex', a term hitherto used to describe the 
conjunction of national government security agencies and high tech industries in 'mass information 
gathering, tracking and routine surveillance' (ACLU, 2007: 11). Scholarly work on this powerful complex 
has generally focused on counterterrorism activities at both local and national scales (Amoore and de Goede, 
2008; Sugden, 2012). There has been little research from within the social sciences that explores this form of 
surveillance for the purpose of safeguarding public health - at the global scale - against emerging infectious 
diseases. Within an expanding literature on biosecurity and preparedness (for example, Collier and Lakoff, 
2008; Ingram, 2010), moreover, scant consideration has been given to the techniques deployed by event-
based surveillance systems, including the 'informal' data on which they are based, and their impact on 
practices of global public health governance. Specifically, there has been a dearth of analysis into the ways in 
which the WHO and its member states utilise the 'informal' information supplied by these systems in order to 
make judgements concerning the spread and severity of global disease outbreaks.  
 
In this chapter, therefore, we focus on the operation of event-based surveillance systems in relation to the 
2009-2010 H1N1 pandemic, identifying in the process their implications for the wider political economy. 
Utilising Margaret Chan’s call for ‘new’ international health diplomacy, we consider how disease risk is 
represented in the international community and we seek to uncover the locations captured by complex 
information networks, mediating in the space between preparedness and response. Specifically, we 
investigate: the spatialities of public health surveillance; the complex nature of pandemic preparedness and 
response; and the diverse biosecurity practices that underpin global public health governance. Through a case 
example, we draw attention to three ways in which the use of event-based surveillance systems advance 
understandings of global public health governance. 
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Firstly, global public health surveillance systems play an important role in locating isolated incidents 
identified and described by 'informal' information sources and in converting them, and the information on 
which they are based, into patterns then used to issue global alerts. However, the implications for global 
governance are messy. Whilst the technologies deployed in this task are largely based in countries of the 
global north - Canada for GPHIN, the US for HealthMap - their success is dependent on the reporting of 
events in localities across the global north and south. Secondly, the authority assumed by the WHO in 
issuing global public health alerts and in securing member state cooperation over pandemic preparedness is 
subject to challenge. Bingham et al (2008) contend that globalised biosecurity practices are often promoted 
by countries of the global north, where the ‘expertise’ is deemed to be located, in the interests of the north 
(see also Collier and Lakoff, 2008; Ingram, 2010). Yet, we maintain that the WHO’s authority is constrained 
by a number of factors, including: access to the surveillance networks; attitudes of member states to 
verification and alerting; and capacity of the WHO to respond to the alerts it receives.  
 
Thirdly, in spite of global pandemic preparedness guidance being issued by the WHO, the reality of the 
H1N1 pandemic was marked by individual member states enacting disparate biosecurity measures. 
Hinchliffe and Bingham note the various practices (or ‘orderings’) involved in the performance of 
biosecurity (2008: 1536-1537). Examples outlined within national pandemic plans include ensuring the 
availability of hospital beds, the distribution of vaccines, and the imposition of restrictions on internal travel 
and public gatherings (Cabinet Office and DH, 2007). Other, more contentious, practices - enacted by certain 
countries during the 2009-2010 H1N1 pandemic - included the imposition of trade embargos against specific 
nations, the declaration of unilateral travel advisories by sovereign states and, in a few cases, state 
implementation of quarantine for travellers from affected areas.  
 
We use these three strands – spatialities of public health surveillance, nature of pandemic preparedness and 
diversity of biosecurity practices – to frame the remainder of this chapter. In doing so, we draw attention to 
the importance of localities, often situated in countries of the global south, in providing the source materials 
to initiate pandemic preparedness procedures.  
 
Methods 
Our analysis is informed by a number of data sources. Policy documents, working papers and pandemic 
preparedness plans produced by the WHO and individual countries were consulted, and reference was made 
to current epidemiological literature. Empirical data on GPHIN was obtained via telephone conversation and 
email correspondence with GPHIN officials. This included information on volume of articles retrieved, 
classification of risk, issuing of alerts and further enhancements to the system. Finally data on the H1N1 
pandemic was obtained from HealthMap, an open-access event-based system, and from dispatches published 
by national regulatory bodies such as the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and 
international news organisations, for example, BBC News. The data collection from these sources facilitated 
analysis of the operation of global surveillance networks and the nature of ‘diplomatic’ openness.  
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Biosecurity and preparedness 
In recent years, biosecurity  - described by Braun as ‘political responses’ to the unpredictability of global 
disease (2007: 19) - has become a prominent subject of enquiry as scholars have sought to understand 
various types of expertise and practices through which disease threats are articulated and managed (Collier 
and Lakoff, 2008; Bingham et al, 2008; Ingram, 2010). Biosecurity processes are performed within what 
Bingham et al describe as a ‘complex geography’ where ‘states and locales are increasingly asked to 
conform to what is regarded (in the metropolitan core) as a safe world’ (2008: 1529). According to this 
viewpoint, it is ‘centralised expertise’, often located in the countries of the global north, that triggers 
‘globalising biosecurity practices’ (Bingham et al, 2008: 1529), which seek ‘maximal cooperation from all 
countries’ (Ingram, 2009: 2).  
 
Fundamental to this approach are the aspirations of transnational organisations such as the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the WHO to see a ‘harmonization and integration’ of approaches to 
biosecurity (FAO, 2007 in Bingham et al, 2008: 1532). These transnational bodies, and others such as the 
World Bank and the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), are located in cities of the north and have 
been perceived as enacting measures that, arguably unduly, focus on ‘problems’ in the global south (Keil and 
Ali, 2006; Calain, 2007). This drive for cooperation raises geopolitical, as well as biopolitical, questions. In 
relation to H5N1 ‘avian’ influenza, for example, it was reported in early 2007 that Indonesia – the country 
with by far the highest rate of reported deaths from the disease - had stopped sharing virus samples with the 
WHO and instead had entered into an agreement with Baxter Healthcare, a private US corporation (Ingram, 
2008: 82). Under this arrangement, Baxter Healthcare were to develop and manufacture a vaccine, with 
Indonesia economically benefitting through 'technical support' and being able to produce the vaccine under 
licence and export it in the future (Shimbo et al, 2008: 645).  
 
The vulnerability of such international systems of biosecurity has, in recent years, been critiqued in relation 
to travel networks. Sociologists, political scientists and geographers have given increasing prominence to the 
implications of global mobility of various kinds for the spread of infectious diseases (Keil and Ali, 2007; 
Budd et al., 2011). Population movement, in particular, has been facilitated by a far-reaching global airline 
network, which, in an era of transport industry liberalisation, permits direct travel from regional airports to 
global cities (Budd et al, 2011). During the last influenza pandemic, in 1968, 261 million passengers 
worldwide travelled by air (ICAO, 1968). In 2011, the world's airlines carried approximately 2.5 billion 
passengers (ICAO, 2011). This increased mobility highlights the ‘epidemiological vulnerability of a closely 
inter-connected and highly aeromobile twenty-first century world’ (Budd et al, 2009: 427). It is a 
vulnerability that was illustrated during the 2003 outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), 
which spread rapidly along major airline routes to infect over 25 countries (Bowen and Laroe, 2006). One 
outcome of the SARS epidemic was the increased development of global surveillance networks such as 
GPHIN, to enable the early identification, and alerting, of disease threats (Blench, 2008a).     
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According to Ingram, biosecurity in the context of concerns about global mobility and, increasingly, security 
is characterised by anticipation of threats ‘which do not yet exist or have not been fully formed’ and 
preparedness, the outcome of the former (2010: 296). Rather than tackling specific dangers, preparedness is 
more concerned with ‘generic capacities that will enable responses to a broad spectrum of contingencies’ 
(Ingram, 2010: 296). It aims to ‘address vulnerabilities in health infrastructure’ by, for example, stockpiling 
drugs, strengthening hospital surge capacity and exercising response protocols (Collier and Lakoff, 2008: 
14). The concept of preparedness has been the focus of growing attention from scholars, the WHO and its 
member states (Collier and Lakoff, 2008). Collier and Lakoff (2008) demonstrate that the interventions 
comprise work across a number of scales, resulting in the assemblage of experts and organisations in new 
initiatives that link health and security.  
 
Preparedness is arguably the enactment of multiple biopolitical realities by many sovereign states (Hinchliffe 
and Bingham, 2008). Examples outlined in national pandemic preparedness plans – often adapted from the 
WHO guidance – include ensuring availability of hospital beds and distribution of vaccines, and the 
imposition of restrictions on internal travel and public gatherings (Cabinet Office and DH, 2007). In the 
context of pandemics, therefore, the scale of the implications for global public health has been highlighted 
and guidance provided on a wide range of interventions within national boundaries. In determining the 
timings of these interventions, global surveillance networks have come to play an important role.  
 
Technological openness: from ‘informal’ information to the issuing of alerts 
A number of scholars have discussed event-based surveillance networks in relation to wider geopolitical 
debates concerning the expansion of sovereign power (Braun, 2007), the defence and military requirements 
of an ‘oligarchic’ global north (Weir and Mykhalovskiy, 2006: 257) and the search for greater global health 
equity (Ingram, 2008). However, there has been little investigation into the actual operation of the 
surveillance networks and the extent to which their use informs debates surrounding international 
cooperation in pandemic preparedness interventions. Public health authorities have increasingly come to rely 
on unstructured 'informal' information – such as internet news and online discussion sites – to safeguard 
against potential disease outbreaks. Indeed, the role of networks such as GPHIN in the detection of rare but 
high-impact outbreaks (such as SARS and H5N1 (‘Avian’) influenza) has been well documented (Keil and 
Ali, 2006; Weir and Mykhalovskiy, 2006). Moreover, Keller et al (2009) reported that, in the last decade, 
almost all major disease epidemics investigated by the WHO were first identified through these sources. 
According to the WHO, these networks proved to be particularly effective in detecting outbreaks among 
populations that ‘do not access health care through formal channels’ (WHO, 2008a: 4). Consequently, 
biosecurity practices, notably alerts, have become ever more embedded in the work of global surveillance 
systems. 
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The work of these networks rose to international prominence during the 2003 SARS epidemic. Reports 
gathered by systems such as GPHIN, coupled with China’s role in concealing information during the early 
spread of the disease, provided the impetus for agreement on the WHO’s revised International Health 
Regulations (IHR) in 2005. The regulations - which came into effect in June 2007 - gave the WHO a legal 
basis for greater intervention in the affairs of member states to enable, as it perceived it, more effective 
global public health governance (WHO, 2008b). Therefore, ‘informal’ information on isolated disease 
outbreaks occurring in various localities was granted a new authority. By identifying patterns amongst the 
information gathered, global surveillance systems such as GPHIN could issue ‘real time’ alerts that would be 
taken seriously by the WHO.     
 
Although the assembly of news articles does not necessarily require international collaboration, we argue 
that subsequent global public health interventions do. In a speech delivered in February 2007, WHO 
Director-General, Margaret Chan argued that the global organisation needed to go further in its preparations 
for, and governance of, public health emergencies of international concern. According to Chan, this 
requirement had been demonstrated by the outcome of ‘recent events’ when collaboration had broken down. 
They included not only China’s concealment of SARS, but also Indonesia’s withholding of H5N1 virus 
samples from the WHO as part of a dispute over proprietary rights to vaccines developed from ‘its’ virus 
strains (Fidler, 2008). In both instances, the consequences resulting from lack of cooperation were seen to be 
harmful to global public health. Chan, therefore, argued that lessons needed to be learnt from these events 
and applied to a ‘new’ international health diplomacy. Firstly, this required the WHO to appeal to ‘national 
self-interest’, with international cooperation in containing SARS having much to do with ‘fear of the 
economic and social consequences’ of failure (WHO, 2007). Secondly, in order to be meaningful, multi-
national cooperation required clear rules for good and poor performance on the international stage: for 
example, a state must not conceal an outbreak. Finally, there was a need for accountability:  
 
‘If we want to enforce the ground rules, we need to find ways of using the power of public and 
political opinion to exert pressure.’ (WHO, 2007) 
 
Thus, within the context of heightened global uncertainty over emerging infections, according to Chan, 
operative international preparedness required member state consensus that there be greater openness in the 
sharing and harmonisation of practices. There needed to be a combination of technological openness, 
inspired by the contemporary 'revolution in communications and information technologies' (WHO, 2010b), 
and diplomatic openness in the promotion of a 'new' international health diplomacy.  
 
GPHIN, perhaps the most established global event-based surveillance system, underlines the WHO's desire 
for greater 'technological openness'. For over a decade, GPHIN has played a major role in alerting 'official' 
organisations to major disease outbreaks. A subscription-based network, its membership includes the WHO, 
the FAO, the European Commission, and the CDC. It is a multilingual internet-based system, established in 
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1997 to provide ‘relevant unverified information on disease outbreaks and other public health events’ 
(Blench, 2008b). In claiming to detect and monitor events across the globe, it gathers information from local, 
national and transnational media outlets in nine languages. Sources of information included websites, news 
wires and local and national newspapers. Notwithstanding the informal nature of this information, GPHIN 
follows a protocol by which this source material is verified and given some credibility. Retrieved articles are 
categorised according to a GPHIN taxonomy and assigned a relevancy score (Blench, 2008a: 301). 
Duplicates are eliminated. Keller et al note that approximately 4000 articles are handled by the system each 
day (2009: 690).  
 
GPHIN categorises articles according to risk, using a combination of automated and human processes. Each 
article retrieved is given a ‘relevancy score’, derived from an algorithm utilising keywords and terms within 
the taxonomy or taxonomies to which it had been assigned (Blench, 2008b: 301). According to Blench, by 
this process of elimination, approximately 15% are ‘published’, 20% trashed and the remaining 65% are put 
forward for human analysis (2008b). The degree of risk posed by an event is therefore indicated by the 
assignation of an alert. Keller et al explain that alerts are judged necessary for events that may have 'serious 
public health consequences’ and they are sent ‘immediately’ to GPHIN users (Keller et al, 2009: 691). In all, 
approximately 7-10 alerts are issued daily (Hitchcock et al, 2007). It is this built-in human scrutiny that 
differentiates GPHIN from counterpart surveillance systems such as HealthMap (Keller et al, 2009).  
 
Notwithstanding the apparent rigour of this approach, it nevertheless poses risks. In particular, alerts rely on 
often uncorroborated information, for example, commentary on: estimation of an incident’s magnitude; 
control and prevention measures that have been considered (in addition to those actually implemented); 
concerns of the general public; and political implications (Hitchcock et al, 2007). These practices of 
identifying and grading risk are subject to continual revision. For instance, ‘enhancements’ to GPHIN, 
implemented from spring 2010, include: clarification as to why a risk has been classified as ‘low’, ‘medium’ 
or ‘high’; and marking up specific texts in reports that GPHIN publish as alerts, in order to illustrate why the 
information has been categorised as such (GPHIN, personal communication, 13/01/10). The human 
involvement in the alerting procedures demonstrates the significance of GPHIN’s role in the preparedness 
process and may also – due to its reliance on the remote assessment of unverified information - be an 
indication of the precariousness of the pandemic preparedness process. Nevertheless, according to a GPHIN 
official, the work of analysts in classifying risk is conducted in accordance with official guidance, such as 
that provided within the WHO IHR (2005) (GPHIN, personal communication, 13/01/10). 
 
For the WHO to issue an alert, additional verifications are necessary, ostensibly involving the detailed event 
management process illustrated below (WHO, 2008c).  
 
 
***Insert Figure 1*** 
8 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, the role of unofficial data – not least from the news media – in facilitating the WHO's global 
health governance remains significant. By its own estimation, more than 60% of WHO initial outbreak 
reports came from ‘unofficial informal sources’ (WHO, 2010c). Moreover, Weir and Mykhalovskiy contend 
that approximately 40% of the news reports on disease outbreaks that were verified by the WHO originated 
from GPHIN (cited in Hitchcock et al, 2007: 210).  
 
Thus, although regulatory developments have undoubtedly conferred new power on the WHO, the evidence 
suggests that it is a power dependent on access to supranational networks (such as GPHIN) and their 
repository of ‘informal’ information grounded in individual countries and localities. Within these settings, 
there will be silences, as well as records of some kind.  
 
Case Example: event-based surveillance and the H1N1 influenza pandemic 2009-2010 
Pandemic preparedness is complex, involving global and national interventions informed by irregular, 
sometimes unstructured, information, and motivated by competing strategic and political priorities (Gostin, 
2009). The 2009-2010 H1N1 influenza pandemic – the first influenza pandemic since 1968 - was particularly 
significant as it represented a ‘test case’ for the WHO’s new pandemic alerting structure. From its initial 
reporting in parts of Mexico in early April to Margaret Chan's announcement on 10 August 2010 that 'the 
new H1N1 virus has largely run its course' (WHO, 2010d), the infectious disease outbreak caused the WHO 
to regularly review its level of alert pandemic influenza alert. Pandemic ‘phases’ – used to ‘provide a 
framework to aid countries in pandemic preparedness and response planning’ (WHO, 2009a) – have been a 
characteristic of WHO influenza guidance since the publication of its first guidance in 1999. Although 
subject to some change over the course of the last decade, the phase structure has consistently included a 
description of significant attributes – the existence of which, we argue, is frequently based on ‘informal’ 
information provided by surveillance systems such as GPHIN - and a list of measures to be enacted by the 
WHO. The designation of a pandemic phase is made by the WHO Director-General, consistent with the 
provisions of the IHR (2005) ‘in consultation with other organizations, institutions and affected Member 
States’ (WHO, 2009a: 20). The timing and sequence of alerts in relation to the 2009-2010 H1N1 pandemic 
influenza outbreak is given in Table 1, below.  
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Pandemic 
Phase 
Declaration by 
WHO  
Probability of 
Pandemic 
Description Key recommended actions 
1-3 Period until 
27/04/09 
Uncertain  Sporadic clusters / small cases of 
disease  
Producing, implementing and 
exercising national pandemic 
preparedness and response plans 
4 27/04/09 Medium to high Verified community-level 
outbreaks 
Rapid containment 
5 29/04/09 High to certain Sustained community-level 
outbreaks in at least two countries 
in one WHO region 
Pandemic response: each country 
to implement actions detailed in 
their national plans 
6 11/06/09 Pandemic in 
progress 
Sustained community-level 
outbreaks in at least one other 
country in another WHO region 
Post-
pandemic 
10/08/10 Activity returned to seasonal 
influenza level in most countries  
Evaluation of response, revision 
of plans, recovery 
Table 1: Level of WHO pandemic influenza alert in relation to 2009-10 H1N1 outbreak. Adapted from WHO (2009a: 
27). 
 
Analysis of the chronology of the pandemic and the spatialities involved demonstrate that, whilst the 
networks of surveillance were profoundly important in shaping the WHO’s alerting process, this 
technological sophistication involved a complex set of interactions between member states, in which 
diplomatic openness competed with national interests. In particular, there were significant moments when 
WHO pandemic alerting, and advice on collaboration, were undermined by member state actions. In this 
section, we identify three such moments. 
 
Period I: until 29 April 2009 (initial alerting) 
Reports of an outbreak from a range of locations were purportedly being processed from as early as 30 
March 2009 (Veratect, 2009). On 1 April 2009, HealthMap identified a local media report, published in the 
Mexican newspaper La Jornada, stating that a respiratory illness had ‘sickened up to 60% of residents’ in the 
village of La Gloria, Veracruz (Brownstein et al, 2009). This account, and further media broadcasts within 
Mexico over subsequent days, reported that residents suspected the epidemic to be linked to the existence of 
manure ‘lagoons’ sited at the Granjas Carroll pig farm, also located in Veracruz, and that Mexican health 
officials had been sent to the area to investigate a report that 400 people were ill, and two had died, as a 
result of the outbreak (HealthMap, WWW).  
 
According to Brownstein et al (2009), it was GPHIN’s alert to the WHO concerning an outbreak of acute 
respiratory illness in the Mexican state of Veracruz on 10 April 2009 that prompted communication of the 
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illness to international institutions such as the WHO’s Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network. 
Reporting within Mexico, therefore, informed the WHO’s decision to issue its initial disease outbreak notice 
on 24 April 2009 (Daily Telegraph, 2009). The next day, the WHO classified the event a ‘public health 
emergency of international concern’ (WHO, 2009b). On 27 April 2009, it increased the level of alert to 
pandemic Phase 4 'medium to high'. Two days later, the alert was raised to Phase 5 'high to certain’.  
 
It was during this early, complex, period that the WHO began to directly issue guidance to member states on 
public health interventions. It advised that ‘all countries intensify surveillance for unusual outbreaks of 
influenza-like illness’ (WHO, 2009b) and affirmed that it was ‘not recommending any travel or trade 
restrictions’ (WHO, 2009c). Yet, the actions of certain countries extended beyond this, counteracting any 
sense of global cooperation (Gostin, 2009). China, for instance, mandated incoming passengers to report flu-
like symptoms at ports of entry when disembarking from H1N1-affected areas (BBC News, 2009). Singapore 
was one of several countries which deployed thermal scanners to screen air passengers on arrival (Cowling et 
al, 2010), whilst Japan intensified the use of pre-existing scanners at Narita Airport (Reuters, 2009a). 
Moreover, in clear contravention of WHO advice, measures were introduced aimed at restricting travel, with 
Cuba, for example, becoming the first country to suspend flights to Mexico on 28 April (Lister and 
Henderson, 2009). These actions caused some academics to conclude that Mexico was being ‘singled out' for 
'all the wrong reasons’ (Condon and Sinha, 2009: 21).  
 
Period II. 29 April – 10 June 2009 (WHO alert at Phase 5) 
The period from late April to early May 2009 represented the height of global and, perhaps, national media 
coverage of the H1N1 outbreak (Warren et al, 2010). At this time, GPHIN was retrieving a total 30,000 
articles a day (GPHIN, personal communication, 13/01/10) (Figure 2, below). 
 
 
***Insert Figure 2*** 
 
 
The WHO repeated its advice against the imposition of travel and trade restrictions. On 2 May 2009, in an 
indication of the importance it attached to its task, the WHO combined with other global institutions - the 
FAO, the OIE and the World Trade Organization (WTO) - to release a joint statement on the H1N1 virus, 
proclaiming that the consumption of pork posed no sanitary risks (WTO, 2009). This was in response to 
various decisions taken by individual states during this period that went beyond WHO advice. According to 
Gostin, 20 countries prohibited meat imports from Mexico, the US and Canada (2009). The main instigators 
included China and Russia, two of the world's biggest pork importers, and the South East Asian nations of 
Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines (Gostin, 2009). In addition, unilateral travel advisories continued to 
be sanctioned by sovereign states. For example, Hong Kong residents were advised not to travel to Mexico, 
whilst, on 2 May 2009, mainland China suspended flights from the country altogether (China View, 2009). 
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At the same time, both China and Hong Kong implemented quarantines for travellers from affected areas, 
whilst Singapore placed recent visitors to Mexico under home quarantine (Gostin, 2009).  
  
The efficacy of these member state measures has been questioned. For example, whilst China deemed its 
virus-control efforts to have been ‘an amazing success’ (Yanzhong, 2010), WHO recommendations advised 
against entry and exit screenings as it did not believe these measures would mitigate the spread of the disease 
(Katz, 2009). Moreover, Cowling et al (2010) reported that, in countries where entry screening measures 
were used, ‘the majority of cases were identified through the local health care system after arrival’ (Cowling 
et al, 2010: 7).  
 
Period III. 11 June 2009 – 09 August 2010 (Phase 6)  
The third, and final, moment commenced with the WHO’s official declaration of pandemic Phase 6 on 11 
June 2009. In her announcement of the decision, Margaret Chan stated that the virus in circulation was 
‘entirely new’ (WHO, 2009e). She gave general advice to member states, requesting that those with little or 
no cases ‘remain vigilant’, whilst countries experiencing widespread disease spread concentrate on 
‘appropriate management of patients’ (WHO, 2009e). Chan also restated the organisation's longstanding 
position against travel restrictions and border closures (WHO, 2009e). Yet, despite this advice, certain 
member states continued to undermine the WHO's global pandemic guidance. Pork import bans remained, in 
some cases, for a number of months. In addition, China continued quarantining travellers throughout summer 
2009 in spite of international censure (Metzl, 2009). By the end of October 2009, 2,046 American citizens 
had been quarantined, with 215 testing positive for H1N1 (Yanzhong, 2010). As late as March 2010, the UK 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office website warned that anyone arriving in China with flu-type symptoms 
might be quarantined for up to seven days.  
 
Discussion and conclusion  
The 2009-2010 H1N1 outbreak represented the first significant global test of event-based surveillance 
networks such as GPHIN, redeveloped following the 2003 SARS outbreak, and of the WHO’s new disease 
reporting and verification framework, established under the revised IHR (2005). It is in the context of a new 
global focus on anticipation and preparedness, and with reference to the notion of a 'Surveillance Industrial 
Complex', that we return to the three arguments we advanced in our Introduction. 
 
i. Spatialities of public health surveillance 
Global public health surveillance systems track information across a range of locations in order to anticipate 
threats which, to use Ingram's phrase, 'do not yet exist' (2010: 296). Historically, they can be seen to 
represent the dominance of the global north, where technologies were developed and deployed to promote a 
particular approach to global health surveillance. Yet, in order for this 'centralised expertise' to operate, 
decisions made to issue alerts often depend on uncovering largely 'informal' information, including ‘rumors’ 
or ‘unusual’ activities – such as sudden increases in acute respiratory illness - broadcast through local press 
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reports, news wires and online sources across the global north and south (Brownstein et al, 2008). Through a 
process of ‘verification’, this information becomes ‘formalised’ and provides a basis for issuing global alerts. 
In the main, it is work based on information in the public domain, on what is said rather than what is left 
unsaid. There will be selectivity and silences in the reporting process. As a result, and in spite of access to a 
vast security apparatus, the global north's authority is constrained. 
 
ii. Complexities of pandemic preparedness and response 
In our case example, it was clear that the WHO had access to information from a number of surveillance 
networks and that the Mexican government demonstrated 'responsibility and transparency' in reporting the 
H1N1 outbreak to the relevant WHO regional office and in sharing its virus samples (CDC, 2009). This 
implies that there was cooperation between the WHO and its member states in seeking verification of this 
public health emergency, with the Mexican government being lauded for sharing information and being 
compliant with surveillance.  
 
However, the cooperation was complex. There is evidence that the WHO were initially slow to respond to 
information received from event-based networks. Brown (2009) has drawn attention to the 14 day gap 
between the transnational organisation receiving a GPHIN alert concerning an outbreak of acute respiratory 
illness in Mexico (10 April 1009) and issuing a disease outbreak notice to the global health community (24 
April 2009). Moreover, as the pandemic proved less severe than initially feared, allegations were made 
against the WHO. Specifically, it was accused of ‘overstating’ the dangers of the outbreak and, according to 
a draft report commissioned by the Council of Europe, of ‘lacking transparency’ (Bosely, 2010). Questions 
were raised about conflicts among members of WHO advisory groups and expert committees, with many 
understood to have received funding from pharmaceutical companies that manufacture antivirals and 
influenza vaccines (Bosley, 2010). Indeed, as the case of Indonesia and the sharing of H5N1 avian influenza 
virus samples demonstrate, the WHO's interactions with the private sector are complicated and subject to 
controversy. Although the WHO-commissioned Review Committee found 'no evidence of malfeasance' 
(WHO, 2011:14), the accusations are a reminder of the growth of 'Surveillance Industrial Complex' in public 
health, encompassing academia, technology companies and vaccine manufacturers.   
 
iii. Diverse biosecurity practices  
The WHO pandemic preparedness guidance accorded member states’ rights to develop their own national 
plans. However, our example has highlighted instances where, in pursuing this flexibility, countries acted 
against transnational guidance in an attempt to secure their borders. For example, legally contentious pork 
embargos were imposed by 20 countries including Russia, China, Philippines and Indonesia (Gostin, 2009). 
Condon and Sinha (2009) argue that these measures, disproportionately applied to Mexico, could discourage 
reporting of future disease outbreaks. Moreover, travel restrictions were enacted by certain states - including 
China, Hong Kong, Argentina and Cuba (Gostin, 2009) – in spite of consistent WHO advice against the 
‘restriction of regular travel’ (WHO, 2009f).  
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At the same time, we identified a number of member state practices which, whilst not in defiance of WHO 
guidance, did extend beyond WHO advice. For example, many countries not only imposed trade embargos, 
passenger health checks prior to disembarkation and thermal image scanning at major airports, but also 
implemented varying degrees of quarantine (China, Hong Kong and Singapore). These practices have, in the 
main, proved to be of limited epidemiological benefit. Moreover, the variations in intervention among 
member states have led to certain countries' practices being criticised for their perceived intrusiveness. For 
example, the UK media used the experience of UK travellers, particularly those subjected to quarantine 
measures, to highlight the extent of overseas pandemic interventions, through headlines such as ‘UK tourists 
hit by ‘overzealous’ checks’ (The Sunday Times, 26 July 2009) and ‘My hell locked up in Egyptian swine flu 
ward’ (Manchester Evening News, 30 July 2009). Whilst it is not unexpected that the UK news media would 
broadcast contentious interventions in such a way (Warren et al, 2010), concern was also expressed within 
more ‘official’, or ‘expert’, discourses. For example, in June 2009, the US Department of State broadcast its 
disapproval of Chinese quarantine procedures, stating that ‘the random nature of the selection process 
increases the uncertainty surrounding travel to China’ (Kralev, 2009). 
 
 
The use of event-based surveillance systems has, therefore, raised new questions about the relationship 
between technological deployment and global public health governance. New political economies have been 
created, particularly with respect to the expansion of the surveillance 'industry' in global public health. These 
have been examined, and problematised, through our case example of the 2009-2010 H1N1 pandemic 
influenza outbreak. The informal openness afforded by event-based surveillance systems has acted as a 
powerful prompt for transnational organisations, such as the WHO, to drive international cooperation in 
pandemic preparedness planning. Yet, the H1N1 pandemic also highlighted varied practices of preparedness 
in existence between countries across the global north and south, which undermined the WHO’s appeal to a 
‘new’ international health diplomacy. Granted, member states have not subverted the WHO’s advice as in 
the manner adopted by Indonesia in relation to the use of H5N1 avian influenza virus samples. Nevertheless, 
the WHO’s attempts to win support for greater international cooperation, observed in connection with the 
alerting and verification of the current H1N1 outbreak, were, at the same time, weakened by the varied 
interventions of individual member states early in its transmission. These messy realities of global public 
health governance complicate existing notions of biosecurity as a set of responses promoted by countries of 
the global north. 
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